Towards an Alternative Relevance-Theoretic Approach to Interjections by Padilla Cruz, Manuel
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE RELEVANCE-
THEORETIC APPROACH TO INTERJECTIONS 
 
MANUEL PADILLA CRUZ1 
UNIVERSITY OF SEVILLE 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interjections are communicative elements that individuals use to express their 
mental states, attitudes or reactions to perceived stimuli. Although they could be 
seen as instinctive, involuntary or uncontrolled verbalisations – symptomatic 
signals (Rosier 2000: 22; Schourup 2001: 1045; Kleiber 2006: 15; Światkowska 
2006: 50) or quasi-reflexes (Nicoloff 1990: 214) – they do not have in many cases 
an instinctive nature (Światkowska 2006), for they involve the speakers’ conscious 
evaluation of the spatio-temporal setting or the selection of an item from among a 
more or less wide set of possible candidates for what they want to express. Their 
formal features, such as their phonological anomalies and morphological 
peculiarities, relative syntactic independence and co-occurrence with other 
linguistic chunks in discourse, have confused grammarians throughout history and 
led some of them to regard them as paralinguistic or peripheral elements (e.g. 
Quirk et al. 1985). This consideration has resulted in a historical lack of agreement 
as to whether they are one of the traditional word classes or parts of speech2.  
Their language- or culture-specificity renders them in most cases so 
idiosyncratic that it is hard for translators to find out exact equivalents in other 
target languages (Fischer and Drescher 1996; Sierra Soriano 1999; Aijmer 2004). 
Since they do not have a constant meaning but are multifunctional and their 
meaning depends on the context where they are produced (Montes 1999; Rosier 
2000; Aijmer 2004; O’Connell and Kowal 2005; Ameka 2006), some authors have 
given them a marginal place in the linguistic system (Światkowska 2006; Cueto 
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 Nowadays, as opposed to those linguists who do not include interjections among their 
word classes (e.g. Huddleston 1988), for those who do so, interjections constitute an open 
(e.g. Buridant 2006) or closed class (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985; Greenbaum 2000), depending, 
evidently, on the criteria taken into account. 
Vallverdú and López Bobo 2003; Ameka 1992a, 2006; Buridant 2006; Kleiber 
2006). As a consequence, they have been almost completely forgotten over 
decades and have not received due attention in linguistics. Other authors have even 
associated them with different categories of linguistic elements, such as particles 
(e.g. Leech et al. 1982: 53-54; but see Ameka 2006; Evans 1992; Wilkins 1992), 
discourse/pragmatic markers3 (e.g. Schiffrin 1987; Montes 1999; but see 
Blakemore 1987; Fraser 1999, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 1993) or conversational 
routines (e.g. Barbéris 1995; Aijmer 2004, but see Ameka 1992a, 1992b, 2006; 
Wierzbicka 1991, 1992). Fortunately, that tendency has recently changed and over 
the last years there have arisen different classifications, which differentiate 
between the so-called emotive/expressive (1), conative/volitive (2), phatic and other 
types of interjections, depending on the criteria on which they are based (e.g. 
Wierzbicka 1991, 1992; Ameka 1992a, 2006; Montes 1999)4. 
 
(1) Yuk! Phew! Oh! Ow! Oops! Ouch! 
(2) Sh! Psst! 
 
Other rather illuminating studies have addressed, for example, the usage of 
interjections in certain languages (e.g. Eastman 1992), their cross-linguistic 
peculiarities (e.g. Aijmer 2004), their acquisition by children and progressive 
incorporation in their speech (e.g. Meng and Schrabback 1999; Montes 1999), or 
their usage in rather specific interactional contexts (e.g. O’Connell and Kowal 
2005; O’Connell et al. 2005; Shenhav 2008). 
Nevertheless, those works have not satisfactorily solved some of their 
problems, such as what and how interjections communicate, and whether they are 
part of language. Within pragmatics, and more exactly, within the cognitive 
paradigm of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004), Wharton (2000, 2001, 2003) has developed an approach to 
interjections aimed at solving these problems. This author proposes that, when they 
occur with utterances, they are linguistic mechanisms that help hearers recover the 
propositional attitude expressed by speakers toward the propositional contents of 
utterances. Thus, they encourage hearers to embed the propositions expressed by 
their interlocutors under speech-act or propositional-attitude schemas, and hence 
contribute to the recovery of what in relevance theory is labelled the higher-level 
explicatures of utterances. Accordingly, when interjections occur together with 
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 For the purposes of this paper, I will leave phatic interjections aside. For a discussion of 
phatic interjections, see Torres Sánchez (2000) and Torres Sánchez and Berbeira Gardón 
(2003). 
another utterance, they would act as illocutionary force indicating devices (Evans 
1992; Wilkins 1992; Wierzbicka 1991, 1992). On the contrary, when they 
constitute an utterance on their own, since they lack a constant semantic content, 
they simply indicate to the hearer, in a rather imprecise way, the speaker’s mental 
or emotional state.  
This paper does not deny the validity of Wharton’s work and, more exactly, the 
claim that interjections guide the hearer to recover the higher-level explicatures of 
utterances. Rather, it seeks to suggest a different, more general approach based 
precisely on the observation of and reflection on some of the problems that it 
poses. Wharton’s approach works with emotive/expressive interjections, but cannot 
be said to apply to conative/volitive ones. Moreover, in many cases interjections do 
not accompany a proposition, but appear alone, constituting full utterances, so they 
could not guide hearers in the recovery of their interlocutors’ attitude toward a 
propositional content. Yet, in those cases the speakers can be assumed not to be 
willing to express their emotions or mental states, but to communicate something 
very specific: non-verbalised thoughts or a set of assumptions that could be 
explicated in terms of propositions. For this reason, this paper will argue that in the 
processing of interjectional utterances hearers may pragmatically enrich them 
thanks to some of their linguistic properties and contextual factors so as to obtain 
fully fledged propositions that correspond to what they think or sense their 
interlocutors intend to communicate. In order to do so, I will firstly summarise the 
current relevance-theoretic approach to interjections as put forward by Wharton 
(2000, 2001, 2003). Then, I will comment on some of its problems and review 
some other proposals about interjections on which this proposal is based5. Finally, I 
will introduce a new approach on which I am currently working. In this paper I will 
only deal with what interjections can communicate when they are independent 
utterances and why they can do so, leaving aside other issues related to their 
interpretation for future work. 
 
 
2. The current relevance-theoretic approach to interjections 
 
Wharton’s (2000, 2001, 2003) approach to interjections rests squarely on some 
of the relevance-theoretic concepts and distinctions:  
a) The distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning, according to 
which some linguistic expressions encode concepts or representations, 
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whilst others encode instructions about how to relate or process chunks of 
information (e.g. Blakemore 1987; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson 
and Sperber 1993). 
b) The notion of explicature, which is the fully propositional form of an 
utterance recovered after the pragmatic enrichment with contextual material 
of its logical form6 obtained from its linguistic decoding (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986, 1995; Carston 2002a; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). 
c) The distinction between lower- and higher-level explicatures, the latter 
being speech-act or propositional-attitude descriptions under which the fully 
propositional form of an utterance, its lower-level explicature, is embedded 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 1993).  
With his work, he reacts against what he calls the conceptualist approach to 
interjections, represented by Wierzbicka (1991, 1992), Ameka (1992a, 1992b) or 
Wilkins (1992, 1995), as he finds the following problems: 
1. Interjections cannot encode conceptual structures and their meaning cannot 
be semantically decomposed in the formulas suggested by Wierzbicka 
(1991, 1992). 
2. Those formulas do not capture why the same interjection can express 
positive and negative feelings in different contexts (Wharton 2003: 46). 
3. Interjections are so context-dependent that it seems unlikely that the only 
contribution of pragmatic factors to their interpretation is the assignment of 
reference to the elements they index, as Wilkins (1992, 1995) proposes. 
4. Interjections seem to be halfway between the natural and the linguistic. Like 
other paralinguistic elements such as grimaces, gestures or tones of voice, 
they retain their naturalness and can be used to communicate provided there 
is an underlying code associated with them. 
5. Interjections do not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances they 
accompany. 
Wharton (2000, 2001, 2003) proposes that interjections do not have conceptual 
meaning, but a procedural meaning that helps the hearer recover the higher-level 
explicatures of the utterance they accompany. As a consequence, they do not 
contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance which they accompany. In his 
own words, interjections encode an instruction which “[…] merely encourages the 
hearer to embed the proposition expressed under speech-act or propositional-
attitude description by constructing higher-level explicatures” (2001: 148). 
Therefore, he regards interjections as “[…] indicators of higher-level explicatures 
containing speech-act or propositional-attitude information” (2003: 54). 
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 In relevance theory, a logical form is a structured set of concepts (Sperber and Wilson 
1986, 1995) or, as Carston (2002b) puts it, a sort of conceptual schema or template. 
Accordingly, the presence of the interjections Huh! in (3a) and Wow! in (4a) may 
lead a hearer to derive the explicatures in (3b) and (4b), respectively: 
 
(3) a. BMWs are cheap cars, huh! 
  b. It is absurd/ridiculous to think that BMWs are cheap cars. 
(4) a. Wow! Your new jacket is cute. 
  b. The speaker is delighted that the new jacket is cute. 
 
Thus, Wharton accounts for what interjections communicate in those cases in 
which they occur with another proposition and project an attitude toward that 
proposition (3). Likewise, his account applies to those cases in which the attitude is 
projected toward a perceived object (4). However, it poses some problems in those 
cases in which interjections stand alone as full utterances, without any preceding or 
following proposition. In such cases, no attitude can be projected toward any 
embedded propositional content because there is obviously no propositional 
content to embed. In such cases the author contends that interjections do not 
convey a higher-level explicature, but a feeling or sensation with which “[…] the 
speaker reveals something about her internal state […] something representational 
[…]” (Wharton 2003: 57). 
Wharton (2003) sees interjections as context-restrictors that “[…] guide the 
comprehension process by narrowing the hearer’s search space and ‘indicating’ the 
general direction in which the intended meaning is to be sought” (2003: 58). They 
contribute to optimal relevance by decreasing the hearer’s processing effort in his 
interpretation. Interjections encode computational instructions regarding the type 
of assumptions that a hearer should activate, or the cognitive effects that he may 
expect in a particular situation (Wharton 2003: 59). Those instructions prompt the 
hearer to activate different attitudinal concepts or types of concepts (Wharton 
2003: 60). Accordingly, an interjection such as Wow! activates attitudinal 
descriptions comprising delight, surprise or excitement: yuk! activates an 
attitudinal description of disgust, and aha! another of surprise, etc. Interjections 
may activate a wide range of possible propositional-attitude descriptions, but the 
precise one the hearer may operate with depends on the context he selects and his 
inferential abilities. When interjections are used alone, they may communicate at 
an implicit level (Wharton 2003: 62). 
Wharton’s analysis preserves the assumption that interjections contribute to 
linguistic communication and have a coded component, but that coded component 
is not conceptual, but procedural (Wharton 2003: 63). He places interjections along 
a continuum that ranges from mere showing to saying. While in cases of showing 
an individual provides the audience with a relatively direct evidence of what he 
wants to communicate, in cases of saying that evidence is much less direct. 
Interjections would be borderline cases (Wharton 2003: 73-76) which, originated 
as natural responses or reactions, can be used to communicate, provided the hearer 
recognises an informative and a communicative intention in the speaker7. They are 
cases of showing insofar as they are relatively direct evidence of the feeling or 
sensation that the speaker intends to communicate and the hearer recognises those 
two intentions in the speaker. They are cases of saying inasmuch as that direct 
evidence originates as a natural expression of emotion and is subsequently 
‘stylised’, so they are coded to some extent. As a consequence of that stylisation, 
Wharton claims that interjections are coded signals, i.e. procedural expressions that 
have evolved to convey information by “[…] pointing in the direction of the 
appropriate conceptual representation” (2003: 81). 
Finally, concerning the problem of interjections being part of the language, 
Wharton (2003: 62-67) does not offer a definitive answer. Taking into account 
their paralinguistic nature, phonological atypicality – which makes it hard in some 
cases to report them by means of a verb such as ‘say’ – their syntactic peculiarities 
and morphological non-productivity, he is inclined to state that interjections are not 
proper linguistic elements. However, since he is aware of their disparateness and 
heterogeneity, he prefers not to give a final answer that applies to the whole class 
thereof, but admits that “[…] an adequate account of interjections should reflect 
this heterogeneity” (Wharton 2003: 66). This seems to imply that we should be 
ready to admit a sort of gradient with interjections that are much closer to a full 
linguistic status and others that are distant from it.  
As can be seen, Wharton’s analysis of interjections is rather coherent with some 
of the postulates of the relevance-theoretic pragmatic approach to communication 
and cognition. In fact, it is made along the same lines as other relevance-theoretic 
analyses of mood indicators (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004), sentential adverbs (e.g. Ifantidou 1992) or hearsay particles 
(e.g. Blass 1990; Itani 1998)8. However, as anticipated above, it also poses some 
problems, which I discuss in the next section. 
 
 
3. Some problems with the current relevance-theoretic 
approach 
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that she wants to communicate, and her communicative intention is her intention to make 
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 Wharton’s treatment of interjections as encoders of procedural meaning has been recently 
followed, for example, by Torres Sánchez (2000), Cueto Vallverdú and López Bobo (2003) 
or Torres Sánchez and Berbeira Gardón (2003) in order to account for the pragmatics of 
interjections in Spanish. 
To the best of my knowledge, Wharton’s (2000, 2001, 2003) proposals have 
been criticised, somewhat unjustifiably, by Wałaszewska (2004). She thinks that 
the fact that interjections share some properties with a number of paralinguistic and 
non-linguistic behaviours that humans use in communication has made Wharton 
(2000, 2001, 2003) argue that his approach can be extended to those behaviours. 
This would apparently involve an extension and application of procedural meaning 
to other linguistic phenomena such as irony, which is quite often induced by those 
paralinguistic or non-linguistic elements. In turn, this application could lead to an 
unmotivated revision of the current relevance-theoretic account of irony in terms of 
echoic use and metarepresentation (Wałaszewska 2004: 124). 
Wałaszewska (2004: 124-126) also finds other problems in the current 
procedural account. On the one hand, if the procedural nature of interjections 
provokes the activation of attitudinal descriptions – ‘delight’ or ‘surprise’ in the 
case of Wow!, ‘pain’ or ‘sorrow’ in that of Oh!, etc. – she considers that “[…] such 
a claim seems to involve a contradiction in terms” (Wałaszewska 2004: 125), as 
those descriptions would require a conceptual basis, even if vague or weak. Indeed, 
as will be seen below, some authors have contended that interjections encode very 
general concepts. On the other hand, Wałaszewska (2004) argues that the current 
analysis of interjections as encoders of procedural meaning that contribute to an 
utterance higher-level explicatures satisfactorily applies to interjections occurring 
with another utterance or proposition, but certainly poses some other problems 
when they occur alone, in isolation, constituting utterances on their own. I firmly 
adhere to her comment that in those cases “[…] it is hard to see what they operate 
on” (Wałaszewska 2004: 125). Wharton contends that interjections can be pointers, 
and give a vague or superficial idea of a speaker’s emotion, feeling or sensation. 
But do interjections always communicate in this way? Can we still maintain the 
assumption that interjections contribute to an utterance higher-level explicatures 
when they occur with no immediately preceding or following proposition? Can we 
always preserve the intuition that interjections are context-restrictors? What 
happens when they occur alone and there is no adjacent utterance? Will the hearer 
only obtain information about the speaker’s attitude when processing them, or can 
he obtain something else, as other authors claim (e.g. Wilkins 1992, 1995; 
Wierzbicka 1991, 1992; Vassileva 1994; Wilmet 1997; Światkowska 2006)? If so, 
how can the hearer obtain that?  
Furthermore, Wharton’s approach does not seem to work well with the so-
called conative or volitive interjections. Speakers do not use this type of 
interjections to express their feelings or emotions, but their desires and intentions, 
even if when doing so they may simultaneously reveal their feelings or emotions. 
In the case of conative/volitive interjections it would be difficult to see how those 
interjections lead hearers to recover higher-level explicatures that are descriptions 
of their attitudes or have to do with their feelings. Rather, such explicatures would 
be directive speech-act descriptions. On the other hand, conative/volitive 
interjections are not in many cases appended to other propositions which hearers 
could embed under speech-act or propositional attitude descriptions, so they would 
not contribute to higher-level explicatures in those cases. 
Bearing these problems in mind, consider the following cases. Firstly, imagine 
a quite familiar context in which a small boy is about to touch, and probably let fall 
down, a very expensive crystal vase placed on a shelf. His mother observes this 
and, in order to prevent him from touching it, shouts (5) or (6): 
 
(5) Hey! 
(6) Oi! 
 
The interjections in (5) and (6) are conative or volitive, but, more importantly, 
they are intentionally produced by the mother, whose intention would be to make 
her son refrain from touching the vase. In this case, we could not admit that the 
interjections simply point toward some assumptions that the son has to activate in 
order to understand his mother’s feeling or sensation, for she is not certainly 
expressing any feeling or sensation. Rather, they signal some assumptions that the 
boy has to use in order to understand that she intends him not to do something. 
Then, would not we say that the mother communicates to the boy her desire that he 
should not touch the vase and not just a feeling or emotion? Could not we say that 
the mother has a very precise informative intention, and that, for communication to 
succeed in this case, her son must infer that informative intention and recover an 
implicit proposition regarding her mother’s desire from that interjectional 
utterance? The problem is how and why the son would recover such a proposition. 
Obviously that would require that he perceived those interjections as intentionally 
addressed to him and attributed to her mother the intention to get him (not) perform 
some action. 
Consider a second context in which a guy is dating his girlfriend. She has 
recently been to the hairdresser’s and changed her hairstyle. When he meets her, he 
notices that she looks great with her new hairdo. Instead of explicitly 
complimenting her new look by means of a compliment formula such as those in 
(7) he resorts to an interjection (8): 
 
(7) a. Nice/Cute hairdo! 
b. You look great/wonderful today with that new hairstyle! 
(8) Wow! 
 
In a context like this, the interjection could not make the girlfriend embed a 
proposition under a propositional-attitude description, for there is no such 
proposition. As in the previous case, the girlfriend could attribute to her boyfriend 
the intention not merely to express a feeling of joy, gladness or pleasure when 
meeting her or noticing her new look, but also an intention to express something 
about it (“Your new hairdo is wonderful”), about her (“You look great today”) or 
about himself (“I (do) like your new hairdo”). In that case, the interjection could 
make the hearer recover his unexpressed thoughts. But to recover those 
propositions the girlfriend will have to know what her boyfriends feels, what 
causes that feeling or what its target is. 
Consider now the following cases noted by López Bobo (2002) in which a 
primary or secondary interjection9 appears in utterances of complex sentences 
replacing one of their clausal constituents. In the first one, two friends are talking 
about a robbery one of them suffered at home, and he is complaining about it. 
Imagine he says (9): 
 
(9) If I catch him (the robber), oh my God!  
 
The speaker utters a complex conditional sentence in which the main clause has 
been replaced by a secondary interjection. From the context of the utterance it may 
be clear to both interlocutors that that individual’s intention could not just be to 
express an emotion or feeling. Nor would it be to transmit an attitude to the 
propositional content of the first clause. He could perfectly intend to communicate 
something like “I will call the police” or “I will not let him go”, i.e. some thoughts 
that she does not (want to) verbalise or for which she cannot find the appropriate 
words and expects the hearer to infer. But for the hearer to recover those 
propositions, he would need to know which specific feeling the speaker is 
expressing, what provokes it or to what it is targeted, and which implications 
having such feeling may have in a person like his interlocutor. Along the same 
lines, imagine a second case in which two close friends are talking about a rather 
beautiful girl, probably because one of them likes her a lot. Suppose that individual 
utters (10), with a sigh in the middle of his utterance: 
 
(10) She is so beautiful that…oh! 
 
In this case, the speaker has resorted to a result clause, but instead of explicitly 
mentioning that subordinate clause, he has substituted it for by an interjection. As 
in the previous case, the hearer could recover the missing clause using contextual 
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 Those monomorphemic interjections that are not homophonous or homonymous with other 
words, constitute independent, non-elliptical utterances by themselves and do not co-occur 
with other word classes are normally referred to as primary interjections (Wierzbicka 1991: 
280, 1992: 161-163; Ameka 1992a: 105-106, 2006: 744), whilst those interjections that are 
words transferred from other lexical categories, have an independent semantic value but are 
used as non-elliptical utterances by themselves to express a mental attitude or state are 
alluded to as secondary interjections. 
information and attribute to the speaker the intention to implicitly communicate 
something like “I like/love her”, “I have fallen in love with her” or “I would very 
much like to marry her” as a result of his expressing a feeling that is originated by 
or targeted to a person or some facts, events or states of affairs, etc. 
As we can see, these examples involve some problems which the current 
relevance-theoretic approach to interjections does not address. In cases like these 
speakers can use interjections in order to intentionally make manifest that they 
have a rather specific informative intention which, even if they do not put it into 
words, hearers can infer by resorting to contextual information. While the 
speaker’s informative intention when using emotive/expressive interjections can be 
to express that she has a certain feeling or experiences a particular emotion that is 
caused by or targeted to some object, person, fact, event or state of affairs, in the 
case of conative/volitive interjections the speaker may intend to communicate a 
rather specific order which the hearer can infer if he attributes to her the intention 
to issue it as addressed to him and what she intends him (not) to do. If hearers 
recover what originates their interlocutor’s feeling or what it is targeted to, or what 
their interlocutor intends them (not) to do, interjections may prompt hearers to 
recover propositions that they may think correspond to their interlocutors’ 
informative intention. This possibility may arise, in my opinion, as a result of some 
of the features of interjections, which I summarise in the next section. 
 
 
4. Interjections, indexicality and conventionalisation 
 
Wilkins (1992, 1995) argues that, although interjectional utterances do not have 
a sentential, clausal or phrasal structure, they can be used to transmit propositional 
contents because of two of their features: their conventionalisation and indexical 
nature. Regarding the former, as a consequence of their repeated usage in (a) 
certain circumstance(s) (e.g. after having observed that an individual gets his finger 
hit), some interjections (e.g. “Ow!” or “Oh!”) may be directly connected with a 
specific meaning (e.g. a feeling of pain). That meaning may subsequently stabilise 
(Wilkins 1992: 148; Schourup 2001: 1045). In effect, the conventionalisation of 
interjections in some contexts is further supported by the fact that they cannot be 
freely replaced by others in those same contexts (Schourup 2001: 1044). For 
instance, after a brilliant performance, it is rather unlikely that the audience shouts 
alas! or yuk!.  
On the other hand, Wilkins believes that interjections have underlying 
referential or deictic components which enable them to “[…] directly index entities 
in the extralinguistic context as fillers of the argument position in the proposition 
underlying [them] […]” (1992: 132). Nevertheless, they differ from other deictic 
elements for which the hearer must only find a referent in that they subcategorise 
argument positions containing deictic elements which must be contextually 
saturated, which enables them to transmit propositions. Accordingly, 
emotive/expressive interjections such as “Ah!” or “Oh!” would respectively give 
access to a concept such as SURPRISE or DISAPPOINTMENT and a very general 
propositional schema such as “I feel X” with a slot for a first person singular 
subject (Wierzbicka 1991, 1992). In turn, calls of alert such as “Psst!” or “Eh!” 
would also index a second person object (Wilkins 1995: 370-371). According to 
Wilkins (1992, 1995), interjections contain a character which encourage the hearer 
to look for the referents of those deictic elements, which the hearer must recover 
using his inferential abilities. He also proposes to consider them as exclamations.  
In the same vein, in her study of French interjections, Vassileva (1994: 107) 
argues that conative/volitive interjections are orders that point towards a very 
specific action that the speaker wants the hearer, subcategorised as an object by the 
interjection, (not) to do: 
 
(11) Chut! / Tst! ORDER/INJUNCTION [YOU, BE QUIET] 
(12) Eh!/Hé!/Ohé! ORDER/INJUNCTION [YOU, ESTABLISH CONTACT] 
(13) Assez!/Barca! ORDER/INJUNCTION [YOU, STOP DOING SOMETHING] 
(adapted from Vassileva 1994) 
 
Along the same lines, Vázquez Veiga and Alonso Ramos (2004) have more 
recently suggested that interjections have a core semantic component, which 
amounts to a concept related to the frequent stable senses with which they are 
customarily used, an utterer- and an interlocutor-component, and a Q-component, 
which refers to a proposition that in some cases can be elided (14), while in others 
it can surface and have a syntactic form (15), for, as Nicoloff (1990: 216) 
illustrates, some interjections can have complementation: 
 
(14) a. ¡Ojo! [Watch out!] 
b. Hurrah! 
c. Oh! 
(15) a. ¡Ojo con el escalón! [Mind the step!] 
b. Hurrah for Manchester United! 
c. Oh for a drink! 
 
Although some authors (Torres Sánchez 2000; Cueto Vallverdú and López 
Bobo 2003: 25-26) do not take interjections to be sentential or propositional 
utterances that have a predicative dimension, state or deny anything or have truth-
conditions, the works by Wilkins (1992, 1995), Vassileva (1994) and Vázquez 
Veiga and Alonso Ramos (2004) seem to support the idea that interjections can be 
phrase-words (Bres 1995), implicated predications, condensed phrases (Wilmet 
1997), or acts of non-phrasal predication (Światkowska 2006). In any case, what is 
important is that some interjections – namely, lexicalised ones – can be “[…] used 
intentionally, or even deceptively […] in conjunction with specific contextual 
assumptions to convey propositions […] but […] they do not themselves 
linguistically encode propositions” (Schourup 2001: 1045). They can only acquire 
a fully propositional content by reference to preceding or following discourse, acts, 
behaviours, states of affairs or objects in a specific context (Barbéris 1995; 
Światkowska 2006: 54), but in them “[…] the contribution of grammar to the 
communicative process reaches its minimum” (Quirk et al. 1985: 88). The 
indexical nature of interjections should not necessarily imply that they contain 
indexical elements such as ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘here’, but rather “[…] that the meaning of 
an interjection is underspecified with regard to the particular situational 
constellation in which it is used (who the speaker is, who the hearer is, the 
relationship between them, what has come before, etc.)” (Aijmer 2004: 104).  
If, as has been seen so far, interjections can be used to convey specific 
propositions, a complete relevance-theoretic account must be able to explain the 
reasons why they can do so and the hearer can recover those propositions, the way 
in which he does so, as wells as the factors or the cognitive abilities on which he 
must rely. For space reasons, I will only address in this paper why and how the 
speaker can be taken to communicate propositions by means of interjectional 
utterances, and leave for a future work some consideration about why and how the 
hearer can recover those propositions. In my opinion, their conventionalised and 
indexical nature can help us understand their semantic potential (Récanati 2004), 
so the approach that I will propose in this paper is partly based on those two 
features. I would not like to deny the validity and explanatory power of the current 
account, as it can be perfectly maintained that interjections in some cases 
contribute to the higher-level explicatures of the utterances they accompany and in 
other cases encourage the hearer to form a representation of the speaker’s 
feeling(s) or emotion(s). However, on the light of the previous examples and 
works, I would like to explore an additional possibility: namely, that in those cases 
in which interjections occur alone as full utterances, they can also prompt hearers 
to recover propositions.  
 
 
5. An alternative relevance-theoretic proposal 
 
Some of the conceptualists’ assumptions do not seem to be on the wrong track. 
In fact, their works show that, even if interjections do not have specifiable, definite 
and constant conceptual contents as verbs, nouns or adjectives do, some of them 
can communicate in some contexts something that can be explicated in 
propositional terms. But, how can they communicate it? And why can they 
communicate it? These are just some questions that a relevance-theoretic approach 
to interjections must answer. 
The conventionalisation of interjections must certainly play a crucial role in 
their production and interpretation. In relevance-theoretic terms 
conventionalisation is understood as the availability of encyclopaedic assumptions 
regarding the usage of certain expressions, their frequent contexts of occurrence or 
their possible meanings (Nicolle and Clark 1998; Žegarac 1998)10. This implies 
that individuals must possess some encyclopaedic knowledge about the potential 
meanings or senses of interjections in very particular situations, about whether they 
can be used to express feelings and emotions or orders and intentions, and even 
which of them. That knowledge, which could vary from individual to individual 
just in the same way as the interjections used to express feelings or orders may 
vary across different communities or groups of speakers, would interact with the 
individuals’ perception of the communicative context and provide them with a 
more or less wide range of differing salient meanings (e.g. Giora 1997) which 
interjections may have in that context. Following Récanati’s (2004) meaning 
eliminativism, the sense or meaning that an interjection can be thought to have in a 
particular circumstance would then highly depend on a relation between its use in 
that situation and the knowledge that individuals have about its use in similar past 
situations with a similar, if not identical, intended meaning.  
The repeated intentional uses of an interjection allow for the possibility of its 
conventionalisation with a sense in certain communicative situations and makes 
that intended sense, stored in the minds of (a group of) speakers of a language, 
highly accessible or predictable in future uses. If the interjection is repeatedly used 
over history in a specific (set of) context(s) with a particular intended sense, that 
sense can be so narrowly connected with it that the interjection can gradually 
become grammaticalised with it. As a result of their grammaticalisation, there 
could even be a sort of underlying ‘code’ stemming precisely from the repeated or 
customary usages of some interjections in very specific situations. It could even be 
reasonable to think that individuals could know that a particular set of interjections 
– emotive/expressive interjections – is normally resorted to so as to express 
feelings or emotions, while another set of interjections – conative/volitive 
interjections – is used to transmit intentions or orders. Hence, individuals could 
associate them with a very general, primitive and vague concept: FEELING in the 
case of emotive/expressive interjections, ORDER in the case of conative/volitive 
interjections. If there were interjections used only to express a very specific type of 
emotion or feeling (e.g. happiness), their meaning potential would be much more 
restricted and individuals might even associate those interjections with a more 
                                                 
10
 Conventionalisation is similar to standardisation in that these two processes involve a 
connection of linguistic expressions with encyclopaedic assumptions about their usage and 
contexts of occurrence, but differs from it in that standardised expressions have and retain a 
linguistic content which allows them to be used as a vehicle to communicate the speaker’s 
informative intention in other contexts. 
specific concept which could be subsumed by the general concept linked to their 
category (e.g. HAPPINESS). In turn, that more specific concept could subsume 
other more specific related concepts (e.g. EUPHORIA). When processing 
interjectional utterances, hearers would have to activate such concepts so as to 
understand what their interlocutor intends to express. 
Interjections do not communicate propositions in the standard way other types 
of sentential, clausal or phrasal utterances do, for interjectional utterances cannot 
be strictly said to encode sentences, clauses or phrases. Nor could they be said to 
encode a sort of propositional template or some sort of basic syntactic structure, as 
could be assumed from some of the conceptualists’ proposals. They do not have an 
ordered surface structure in which syntactic constituents can be easily identified. 
However, they could encode some procedures that may make the hearer recover 
some information that is essential to understand what the speaker intends to 
communicate with them in a particular context. 
As a result of a speaker having a specific informative intention, she can resort 
to a linguistically encoded sentential utterance to make manifest that intention. 
Obviously, verbal communication based on the usage of linguistically encoded 
utterances, risky though it may be, is possibly one of the best ways for the speaker 
to make the hearer know that intention. When the hearer processes a linguistically 
encoded utterance, he decodes it sequentially and, based on his grammatical 
knowledge, obtains its logical form, which he must then pragmatically enrich 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). Since syntactic 
constituents cannot be distinguished in interjectional utterances, they cannot be 
said to be properly decoded, so their processing cannot yield a logical form in the 
same way as the linguistic decoding of other utterances does. If so, how can the 
hearer process them?  
Although interjections do not encode a logical form in the same way as other 
sentential, clausal or phrasal utterances do, the examples above (5-10) suggest that, 
even if those interjections could be perfectly interpreted as spontaneous, 
involuntary or unconscious reactions to certain behaviours, states of affairs, 
objects, etc., given the adequate facial expressions, paralinguistic gestures or tones 
of voice or pitch – indeed, Quirk et al. (1985: 853) explain that many interjections 
are associated with concrete phonological features, such as extra lengthening and 
wide pitch range – their speakers could also be perfectly attributed a very specific 
informative intention, i.e. they could be willing to communicate something very 
specific which, even if not explicitly communicated in the relevance-theoretic 
sense (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004), can be 
explicated in terms of propositions or predications. In cases like those in which 
interjections are intentionally produced, they could procedurally encourage the 
hearer to access some contextual elements, such as objects, events, actions, states 
of affairs, propositions or manifest assumptions, to which they are projected or 
targeted. Accordingly, emotive/expressive interjections could encourage the hearer 
to look for a contextual element that originates the feeling that the speaker 
expresses or is the target of that feeling. On the contrary, conative/volitive 
interjections could make the hearer look for contextual elements that constitute 
what the speaker intends the hearer (not) to do. Those contextual elements, 
together with the feeling or order that the hearer can associate with a particular 
interjection, would be the coordinates the hearer will need to construct some sort of 
very schematic proposition that would capture the speaker’s feelings or desires. 
That very schematic proposition can in turn be exploited by the hearer so as to 
derive further implicatures, whose weakness or strength will depend on the amount 
of further contextual information required. 
With an emotive/expressive interjection the speaker expresses that she feels 
something towards or because of some contextual element, while with a 
conative/volitive interjection she expresses that she wants someone (not) to do 
some action. By means of interjections the speakers tries to make the hearer 
attribute to her some feelings or desires. In fact, if asked what they meant by means 
of an interjectional utterance, the speakers might be able to paraphrase it as a 
sentential, clausal or phrasal utterance. Likewise, if the hearers of those 
interjections were asked what they think their interlocutors might have meant with 
them, they could probably say that speakers’ intention was very specific and 
manage to put it into words, even if the proposition that they construct may not be 
an exact reduplication of the one that the speaker could have thought of or that 
proposition could significantly differ from it. Nonetheless, both the speaker and the 
hearer could probably recognise and identify an underlying proposition in an 
interjectional utterance, which actually constitutes the speaker’s informative 
intention. This can be possible because interjections are intentionally produced in a 
rather specific context, in a way that resembles other previous usages, and can 
point to some contextual elements that the hearer must access in order to 
understand the speaker’s informative intention. Individuals can use interjections as 
the (imperfect) vehicle to make manifest their informative intention because, when 
pragmatically enriched with the contextual information manifest to individuals and 
their encyclopaedic information about what interjections can be used to 
communicate in certain circumstances, hearers can infer a wide range of 
propositions. But how can the speaker be certain that the hearer will recover what 
she intends to communicate by means of an interjectional utterance? As has been 
pointed out, interjections can be considered exclamative utterances (Wilkins 1992, 
1995). This proposal opens a path that is worth exploring. If there is a type of 
interjections that can be regarded as exclamative utterances that is the class of 
emotive/expressive interjections. Conative/volitive interjections would be cases of 
imperative utterances. 
One of the most significant contributions of relevance theory (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) has been the analysis of 
exclamative sentences as cases of non-attributive metarepresentations of desirable 
thoughts, propositions or information in general (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; 
Wilson 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1988, 2002, 2004). If we concede 
emotive/expressive interjections the status of exclamative sentences, and, in effect, 
they share with these suprasegmental or prosodic features such as tones and 
contours, then with an emotive/expressive interjectional utterance the speaker can 
metarepresent a non-verbalised thought or proposition that she expects and intends 
the hearer to entertain in a certain communicative situation. In other words, due to 
their procedural nature, interjections can be used to transmit in some cases an 
extremely incomplete, rather schematic or condensed thought or proposition, 
which the speaker expects and intends the hearer to entertain by relying on the 
contextual elements they signal and the encyclopaedic information about them. 
Accordingly, the relevance of emotive/expressive interjections lies on the fact that 
the speaker encourages the hearer to entertain such thought or proposition using 
encyclopaedic information about their senses, contexts of occurrence and the 
contextual elements that they point. By doing so, the hearer can obtain a 
proposition that can result in cognitive effects. 
On the other hand, imperative sentences in relevance theory have been analysed 
as cases of non-attributive metarepresentations of desirable states of affairs 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). 
Conative/volitive interjections signal or point some state of affairs and 
metarepresent it as desirable from the speaker’s point of view. Accordingly, their 
relevance resides in the fact that the speaker encourages the hearer to discover the 
state of affairs she points by means of them, what she expects from him or what 
she intends him (not) to do. 
To illustrate this, consider the case of two individuals who meet in a street and 
one of them produces an emotive/expressive interjection such as (16), with both a 
precise informative intention and a communicative intention. Due to the role of 
interjections as context-restrictors that activate certain assumptions, the hearer may 
activate assumptions such as those in (17): 
 
(16) Yippee! 
(17) a. I have met my friend John. [Contextual assumption] 
 b. I have not met him for a long time. [Contextual assumption] 
 c. It is (always) pleasing to meet an old/good friend. [Encyclopaedic assumption] 
 d. When someone meets an old/good friend, s/he may be happy. [Encyclopaedic 
assumption] 
 e. When someone meets an old/good friend, s/he shows his/er happiness. 
[Encyclopaedic assumption] 
 f. “Yippee!” expresses happiness for something. [Encyclopaedic assumption] 
 In this context, the speaker may have spontaneously or involuntarily expressed 
a feeling of happiness or pleasure, but she may also have the informative intention 
to make manifest to the hearer that the feeling of happiness or pleasure that she 
experiences is motivated by or targeted to her meeting him. Although (16) does not 
have a surface sentential or phrasal structure, it is a conventionalised interjection. 
Owing to its conventionalised nature, the hearer will find in his encyclopaedic 
knowledge information about the possible feelings that the speaker may intend to 
express with that interjection in different situations and in this particular one. The 
interjection, furthermore, signals some contextual elements that the hearer will 
have to access in order to infer his interlocutor’s informative intention. In this 
example the contextual element that causes the feeling expressed or to which that 
feeling is targeted is the encounter. The hearer may think that the speaker has 
intended to make manifest to him some or all of the assumptions he might have 
activated, and, therefore, that they may be part of her informative intention, so he 
will have to determine which of them actually constitute her informative intention. 
In this case, he will have to determine which contextual element causes the 
speaker’s feeling or to what it is targeted. If he does this correctly, he will infer a 
proposition like (18), whose weakness or strength will depend on the amount of 
inference and contextual information the hearer needs:  
 
(18) The speakerx is happy/glad/pleased/exultantz at timet because shex has met 
mey at timeu. 
 
In the example discussed above in which the small boy is about to touch the 
crystal vase and his mother produces an interjection such as (5) or (6), repeated 
here as (19), the interjection could make the son activate any of the contextual 
assumptions in (20), but would signal some event or state of affairs, in this case the 
more than likely touching of the expensive and fragile crystal vase (20c). With that 
signalled contextual element and the encyclopaedic information that the 
interjection is normally used to issue orders (21), the son could infer that his 
mother is expressing an order that has to do with that state of affairs, i.e. that she 
thinks it desirable that he did not touch the vase in question. From this, he could 
infer any of the propositions in (22):  
 
(19) Hey!/Oi! 
(20) a. That vase is made of crystal. [Contextual assumption] 
b. Crystal vases are fragile and can easily break into pieces if they fall down. 
[Encyclopaedic assumption] 
c. My mother has seen that I am about to touch it. [Contextual assumption] 
(21) People normally shout “Hey!/Oi!” when they want someone (not) to do 
something. [Encyclopaedic assumption] 
(22) a. Don’t touch it/that (vase)! 
b. I don’t want you to touch that vase! 
c. Leave that vase! 
d. I order you not to touch that vase. 
 
Finally, when the guy’s girlfriend appears with a new hairdo and he utters an 
expressive interjection such as (8), repeated here as (23), the girlfriend could be 
encouraged to infer a proposition similar to those in (26) as a result of her 
accessing contextual assumptions like those in (24) and encyclopaedic information 
about that interjection (25). That proposition could additionally make the hearer 
derive assumptions like those in (26) as cognitive effects:  
 
(23) Wow! 
(24) a. I have changed my hairdo. 
b. My new hairdo is cute. 
c. My new hairdo makes me look more elegant/fashionable/beautiful. 
d. I like my new hairdo. 
e. This is the type of hairdos my boyfriend likes. 
(25) People normally say “Wow!” to show their admiration/approval of or surprise 
at something they have just seen/noticed/realised, etc. 
(26) a. My boyfriend likes my (new) hairdo. 
b. My boyfriend adores my (new) hairdo. 
c. My boyfriend is surprised by my new look. 
d. My boyfriend is amazed by my new look. 
e. My boyfriend approves of my new hairdo. 
(27) a. I look great with this hairdo. 
b. My new hairdo is cute. 
c. My boyfriend indeed loves/adores/admires my new aspect. 
d. The hairdresser has done a great job. 
e. I will go back to that hairdresser’s in the future. 
 
In cases like these, an interjection that is (highly) conventionalised in a specific 
context procedurally leads the hearer to resort to some contextual information that 
helps him infer the speaker’s informative intention. What the speaker does when 
producing emotive/expressive interjections is to metarepresent a thought which she 
expects or intends the hearer to entertain, while she presents a state of affairs as 
desirable when she resorts to a conative/volitive interjection. With both types of 
interjections, the speaker points toward some contextual element that she expects 
and intends the hearer to activate and use so as to derive propositions that may help 
him grasp her informative intention and from which he may obtain additional 
cognitive effects. 
The proposal outlined here could also account for those cases noted by López 
Bobo (2002), repeated below as (28-32). In them, speakers replace a clause in a 
complex sentential structure by emotive/expressive interjections. By means of 
those interjections, speakers encourage their interlocutors to access the contextual 
material pointed, and to which a certain feeling is targeted, in order to recover 
implicatures that could be part of their informative intention: 
a) Complex sentences in which an interjection replaces a main clause, as in 
some conditional sentences: 
 
(28) If I catch him (the robber)… oh my God!  
(29) If he reads relevance theory… wow! 
 
b) Complex sentences in which an interjection replaces a subordinate clause, 
such as a result clause (30, 31) or a comparative clause (32):  
 
(30) I am so tired that… oh my God! 
(31) It is so good that… dam it! 
(32) Mary is more intelligent than… hell! 
 
In (28) the speaker may encourage the hearer to derive implicatures such as 
“My interlocutor will call the police” or “She will not let the robber go” as a result 
of projecting a certain feeling (e.g. wrath, anger, annoyance, vengeance, etc.) 
towards some hypothetical subsequent event or state of affairs that would obtain if 
the speaker caught the robber. That event or state of affairs would become manifest 
as a result of activating a mental frame or scenario related to the potential 
consequences that catching a robber might have or the subsequent reaction that 
someone may have. In turn, when processing (29) the hearer may be led to derive 
implicatures such as “I will be (positively) surprised/amazed”, “He will understand 
things much better” or “He will get a much broader view of pragmatics”, if he 
perceives that the speaker has projected a specific feeling (e.g. amazement, 
surprise, approval, unexpectedness, etc.) towards some virtual subsequent outcome 
that reading the theory in question may have. Assumptions related to that outcome 
may be manifest to both interlocutors as a consequence of accessing a mental 
scenario about the implications that reading some scientific work may have.  
When processing (30) the hearer may understand that the speaker signals some 
potential or predictable consequence that her being so tired may make manifest to 
the hearer and expresses a feeling toward one or some of those manifest 
consequences. Therefore, he could infer propositions such as “My interlocutor will 
go to bed right now”, “My interlocutor wants to sleep”, “My interlocutors is (very 
much) looking forward to going to bed” or “My interlocutor cannot work any 
longer/do anything else”. In a context in which it is mutually manifest to the 
interlocutors that they have tried an excellent meal at a very trendy but expensive 
restaurant, when hearing (31) the hearer could perceive that the speaker expresses 
some feeling toward a potential consequence that the meal being excellent but 
expensive may have. If it is manifest to the hearer that the speaker has certainly 
enjoyed it, it might be manifest to him that the speaker would not probably mind 
having lunch at that restaurant again or ordering the same meal in spite of its high 
price, or that she would not mind recommending the restaurant or the meal to her 
friends even if it is a bit expensive. Consequently, the hearer could infer 
implicatures such as “I do not care/mind (paying so much money for it)” or “My 
interlocutor would like to try/would not mind ordering this meal again in spite of 
the price” or “My interlocutor will recommend this meal to her friends (in spite of 
its price)”. Finally, in a context in which it is manifest to the hearer that the speaker 
feels envy or disappointment, does not like Mary or regrets that Mary is so 
intelligent a girl, he may understand that with the interjection in (32) she signals a 
set of potential individuals whose intelligence Mary’s is compared to and projects a 
specific feeling towards the fact that Mary may be more intelligent that those 
individuals. As a consequence, the hearer may derive implicatures such as “My 
interlocutor is disappointed by the fact that Peter is less intelligent than Mary” or 
“My interlocutor is angry by the fact that Mary is more intelligent than any other 
student in the class”. 
If linguistically encoded communication is an intrinsically risky activity that 
can give rise to many misunderstandings and even completely fail, in the 
interpretation of interjectional utterances those risks and the probability of failure 
significantly increase because interjectional utterances do not have the syntactic 
surface structure characteristic of other utterances which, though not guaranteeing 
the success in communication, considerably facilitate it. If, as has been put forward 
in this paper, hearers can infer propositions from interjectional utterances as a 
consequence of their procedurally signalling some contextual elements which 
originate a feeling or emotion or towards which a feeling, emotion or order is 
targeted, one of the questions that must be answered is how hearers can infer those 
propositions. This certainly requires an explanation that addresses not only the 
linguistic properties of interjections, but also the cognitive abilities that hearers 
must have and work with in their interpretation. However, as mentioned above, I 
will leave that issue for future work. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As stated above, the aim of this paper was not to deny the validity and 
explanatory power of Wharton’s (2000, 2001, 2003) current approach, as it can be 
maintained that hearers may exploit interjections in order to construct the higher-
level explicatures of utterances. Rather, its purpose has been to suggest an 
alternative, more general framework that can be applied to some linguistic contexts 
in which interjections may appear so as to account for their meaning potential. In 
doing so, it has taken into account some of the theoretical tools and latest 
developments of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004) and previous work on interjections. Although the approach to 
interjections presented in this paper also considers that interjections do not encode 
very stable, constant or specific conceptual contents, it shares with the so-called 
conceptualist approach the treatment of interjections as indexical elements that 
may be used to point to contextual material that the hearer needs in order to 
understand the speaker’s informative intention when producing an interjectional 
utterance. This paper has suggested to extend the relevance-theoretic analysis of 
exclamative utterances to emotive/expressive interjections and, accordingly, to 
treat them as cases of utterances that encourage the hearer to construct a certain 
fragmentary or schematic proposition – which the speaker does not communicate 
by means of a sentential, clausal or phrasal utterance – as a result of their signalling 
some contextual element that causes the speaker a particular feeling or towards 
which the speaker projects that feeling. On the other hand, this paper has proposed 
to consider conative/volitive interjections as cases of imperative utterances with 
which the speaker points to some object, state of affairs, event, action, etc. which 
the hearer must access so as to infer which state of affairs the speaker presents as 
desirable from her own point of view. 
Some readers may wonder whether the approach here presented would imply a 
complete rejection of Wharton’s (2000, 2001, 2003) current account of 
interjections, or how his and this account can be reconciled. This account agrees 
with Wharton’s in the belief that interjections are procedural elements. However, 
the picture Wharton’s offers is a little bit restrictive because it only focuses on two 
usages of interjections, limits the procedures encoded by interjections to the 
recovery of higher-level explicatures, and does not consider contexts in which they 
can be taken to be the (imperfect) linguistic means individuals may intentionally 
resort to so as to communicate non-verbalised beliefs, feelings, desires and 
intentions that can be assigned a propositional form. For this reason, the account 
here presented should be understood as suggesting that interjections encode 
different procedures and their procedural meaning can therefore induce hearers to 
discover which contextual elements (objects, events, states of affairs, actions, 
assumptions, propositions, etc.) interjections signal, since it is those elements that 
originate the feeling the speaker expresses, are its target or have something to do 
with the state of affairs that she presents as desirable. This should not exclude the 
possibility that speakers exploit interjections to communicate information about 
their feelings or emotions and hearers take them into account in order to recover 
that information when building the higher-level explicatures of utterances in those 
cases in which interjections are appended or juxtaposed to other utterances or 
propositions. 
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